REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
OF "n"EGLIGENCE




Typically, this approach states that the violation of a statute is presumptively an act which the trier of fact must conclude to be "n"egligent, unless such presumption is otherwise rebutted by evidence of some proper excuse or justification for violating the statutory standard of care. On the one hand, this approach requires the trier of fact to conclude (as a matter of fact) that the statutory violation was "n"egligent, while at the very same time it still allows such violations to be completely exonerated from any finding of "n"egligence if a proper excuse is offered for such a violation. If no excuse is offered by the statutory violator, then this presumption of "n"egligence approach becomes identical in all material respects with the negligence per se approach whereby the jury is instructed that it must find "n"egligence.

However, under the rebuttable presumption of "n"egligence approach, whenever the statutory violator does offer an excuse or other legal justification for violating the statute, the trier of fact is then required to evaluate that excuse in accordance with the traditional R.P.P. standard of conduct. If the trier of fact concludes that the excuse was otherwise "reasonable" under the circumstances, then the statutory violation is simply disregarded altogether. Any conduct by the alleged statutory violator in disobeying the statutory standard would not be regarded as "n"egligent at all. Thus, the procedural effect of the rebuttable presumption of "n"egligence approach to statutory violations is exactly the same as in the evidence of "n"egligence approach in every case where the statutory violator offers any evidence to justify or otherwise excuse an alleged statutory violation. In order to get any case of alleged statutory negligence to the trier of fact (instead of having the applicable statutory standard determined by the court as a matter of law), the alleged violator merely has to offer evidence of some excuse which, if believed by the trier of fact, would then justify the violation under the particular circumstances unique to the case.

 

 




Copyright 1999 by Edward C. Martin
Last modified: 10/08/01